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Conflicting Living Standards The Evolution of Mediterranean Employment Regimes in an Age of Mass Migrations

Conflicting Living Standards
The Evolution of Mediterranean Employment Regimes
in an Age of Mass Migrations

Emmanuel COMTE

This article deals with the developments that characterized the employment regime in France since the late 1960s and their consequences, considering the French case as a typical case in Mediterranean Europe. The concept of employment regime is defined, according to the introduction to this volume, as “the prevailing arrangements in a country or set of countries to determine the level of wages, the duration of employment contracts, the conditions governing dismissals, and the proportion worked.” These arrangements are analysed as the result of a balance of power between several actors. This article relies on secondary sources but also on primary sources from the archives of the Council of Europe, the archives of the Council of Ministers of the European Union, the archives of the Élysée during the François Mitterrand presidency, European Council conclusions, as well as French and Spanish legal or statistical publications related to employment issues. The first part presents theoretical mechanisms. The second part describes the transformations of the employment regime in France from 1968 to the mid-2000s and the consequences of these developments. The third part develops, from the French case, a general pattern for Mediterranean Europe.

Theoretical Mechanisms

A labour market – for example that of the building industry – is the meeting place between a labour supply (which increases with the wage level) and a labour demand (which decreases with the wage level). Among the population of workers likely to enter a specific labour market, the number of workers actually entering the market increases as the wage proposed increases. Among all firms ready to recruit workers on this market, the number of firms actually entering the market decreases as the market wage rises. The market equilibrium occurs at a wage level (WE) to which the supply and demand for labour are equal (LE).

The demand for labour in a particular sector, however, depends on the demand the firms of that sector face for their products. When firms sell more, they are ready to recruit more and vice versa . Graphically, this results in shifts of the demand curve on the labour market to the left in downturns, or, to the right in economic booms. Equilibrium wages and employment levels change accordingly.

Over time, the wages for the considered labour market fluctuate between a minimum and a maximum according to the general economic situation.

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Immigration is another factor of change on the labour market. A first case, that of labour markets in Northwest Europe in the late 1950s and early 1960s, is characterized by immigration due to a surge of labour demand in a context of general economic expansion. To facilitate market adjustments, trade unions and employers agreed to hire immigrant workers who were recruited in their countries of origin. This corresponds to an increase in labour supply.

A second case of immigration, which was that of immigration to France from the 1960s onwards, is characterized by the absence of a corresponding increase in labour demand. The labour supply in the destination country increases independently because the populations of the origin country can migrate autonomously, the flow being activated by wage differences between the two countries. Under these conditions, as is shown graphically below, immigration in the rich destination country leads to a downward pressure on wages.

When wage differences are high between the two countries, the downward pressure on wages in the destination country is bound to last and threatens the stability of local workers’ wages. To stem this process, trade unions in the destination country demand State intervention to restore their previous wage level. A legally minimum wage, even during downturns, is set by law or by collective agreements in economic sectors. The rigidity of the normal wage opens up the possibility of unemployment, in the case of increased labour supply (as below) or of a drop in labour demand, because the normal wage is higher than the equilibrium wage.

Fixing the rigid normal wage can also generate inflationary tensions, which do not appear in the graph above as it mentions the real wage. Employers may indeed attempt to respond to the new rigid normal wage by increasing the prices of their products. Unions then rapidly ask for an increase of the normal wage in accordance with the evolution of the price index. Each of these two steps generates inflation and this sequence can recur several times.
The normal wage is set high for local workers because the pressure of immigration will reduce the prevailing wage at the level of the normal wage, even in times of expansion. The labour productivity cycle implies however that, during downturns, the normal wage is higher than the productivity of the workforce. Given the set normal wage, the firm cannot during these periods decrease the real wage and make so some workers leave in order to make the normal wage and the productivity of the workforce correspond. The firm loses by paying its employees. If these losses are durable, the firm may go bankrupt. In this context, the firm wants to dismiss some of its employees in order to make the productivity of remaining employees increase up to the level of the normal wage. This however requires that the firm has a number of employees in short-term contracts whom it can easily fire in the event of difficulties. The firm can also structurally increase the productivity of its employees, following the setting of the normal wage. This requires that the firm enjoys, especially during downturns, easy access to credit to acquire more sophisticated machines, for example.
Showing how these different mechanisms were at work in the evolutions of employment regimes in France and, more broadly, in Mediterranean Europe now matters.

The Transformations of the French Employment Regime since the late 1960s

From the Growth and Autonomy of Intercontinental Migration Flows to the 1968 Uprising

During the 1960s, migration toward the economic core of Europe increased and expanded. The number of foreign workers in Western Europe rose from 1.8 million in 1960 to nearly 4.5 million in 1974. [1] While migration had hitherto mainly taken place between European countries, as a result of improved transportation and communication, and as a result of previous colonial links, most Mediterranean countries, but also already some West African countries experienced movements of emigration toward rich booming European centres. Migration offered unprecedented opportunities to improve standards of living for increasingly numerous populations. In 1969 alone, more than 350,000 Algerians migrated to France. [2] This increased supply on European labour markets was unevenly matched by an increased demand. In West Germany, on the one hand, needs were enormous. With the number of vacant posts reaching 787,100 in October 1969, the number of unemployed West Germans was only 107,800. [3] Hundreds of thousands of foreign workers therefore had no influence on the equilibrium wage of the German labour market. In France, on the other hand, the ratio of offers transmitted by firms to the total inflow of permanent workers was 1 to 4 between 1965 and 1968. [4] Immigration was therefore likely to modify the equilibrium wage of the labour market.
A major factor of growth, the new immigration in France created also downward pressures on the equilibrium real wages of low-skilled labour markets and deteriorated working conditions for less skilled workers. Immigrant workers indeed sought to accumulate a maximum of money during their temporary stay in France, to send to their families living abroad. This inclination of a growing share of the workforce encouraged employers to increase working hours. In 1966, one third of employees worked at least 53 hours per week. [5] The availability of cheap and unskilled labour also encouraged employers to invest less and to standardize work on simple and repetitive tasks. The downward pressure on wages caused by immigration in France was bound to last because of large differences in living standards between France and immigrants’ countries of origin. In the early 1970s, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita demonstrated a ratio of 1 to 19 between Maghreb countries and France. By comparison, the same ratio between Turkey and West Germany was only 1 to 8. [6] In addition, in West Germany, the share of European Economic Community (EEC) migrants was much higher than in France : 25% of migrants in West Germany in 1970 came from EEC countries, whose living standards were higher, against only 5% of EEC migrants in France. [7] The situation was all the more worrying in France that the government seemed to have lost control of immigration flows. While the National Immigration Office (
Office national de l’immigration ) normally had the monopoly of the introduction of foreign workers in France, in 1968, 82% of immigrant workers had entered the country through irregular channels. [8] In West Germany, the possibility of reducing the level of the immigrant population was larger. During the downturn in 1966-1967, the number of foreign workers decreased in a year by almost a quarter, from 1.3 to 1.0 million. [9]
These factors caused the French labour uprising of spring 1968. Clashes began in 1967 in large industrial establishments : in the Rhodiacéta factories in Lyon and Besançon, and in the Saviem factories in Caen. In May and June 1968, ten million workers took part in strikes and occupations. Unlike the French case, the climate in other immigration countries in Europe was quieter. As the historian Karl Lauschke writes, “Germany did not go through a proletarian May 1968 as did France”. [10] While the number of workers striking multiplied by the number of days the strike lasted reached 76 million in France in 1968-69, this number was only 171,000 in Germany in 1969-70. [11]

Increased Conventional Wages, Inflation and Unemployment

The main union claim of May 1968 was not a simple one-time increase in wages, but an unprecedented rise in the minimum wage. The first point of the draft Grenelle Agreement of May 27, 1968, was devoted to the “hourly rate of the SMIG” [12] ( salaire minimum interprofessionnel garanti , guaranteed interprofessional minimum wage). It was intended to rise to 3 francs on 1 June 1968. Fixed at 2.15 francs in June 1967, [13] this amounted to a nominal increase of 40% over one year and a real increase of 33.3%. [14] By comparison, the SMIG, set at 78 old francs in 1950 at the time of its creation, [15] had increased by only 23.5% in seventeen years at constant prices ; that is to say, its average rate of increase beyond inflation was less than 1.25% per year. Through this unprecedented attention to the minimum wage, unions intended to place a rampart against the decrease of wages for low-skilled workers. This decrease was caused by the connection through migration flows between France and much poorer territories. As a result of the minimum wage increases, employers had to increase the investment rate to take full advantage of the skills of their workforce and bring productivity to the level of wages. This increased investment rate would improve working conditions. The draft Grenelle Agreement also provided, in its third point, an overall increase of 10% of wages in the private sector effective from 1 October and, in its fourth point, a reduction of working hours so as to reach the 40-hour week.
Employers then sought to transfer wage increases on prices. The last point of the draft Grenelle Agreement noted that the CNPF (
Conseil national du patronat français , national council of French employers) had asked the government for a relaxed control of prices. [16] Nevertheless, the penultimate point of the agreement projected to give special attention to the evolution of the purchasing power of employees. Above all, the SMIG, which fell within the discretionary power of the government, was replaced in 1970 by the SMIC ( salaire minimum interprofessionnel de croissance , interprofessional minimum wage for growth), which was indexed on the evolution of the national index of consumer prices. [17] Therefore, price increases did not trigger a decline in the real minimum wage. The opposite took place. In December 1982, the SMIC was fixed at 20.29 francs. [18] From 1967 to 1982, at constant prices, the minimum wage had been multiplied by 2.5. [19] In addition, until the end of the 1960s, there were in the Province and in certain professional sectors reductions of the SMIG. These reductions were abolished with the SMIC. As a result, the increase of the minimum wage was for these geographical areas and these professional sectors even more important. These movements generated inflation, which, during this period, was always higher in France than in Germany with even an average difference of more than 5 percentage points from 1974. [20] Devaluations also participated in the inflationary spiral ; they should have allowed French companies to resist competition from EEC firms, particularly German firms, which did not face the same constraints. Inflation and devaluations weakened the franc, which suffered from mistrust on the part of international investors, whereas the new wage standard required substantial investments.
The second consequence of the minimum wage increase, compounded by the level of inflation and the lack of investments, was an increase in unemployment, which erupted with the economic downturn of the early 1970s. Unemployment affected those whose professional and/or linguistic skills did not allow them to cross the threshold of the minimum wage. They were first and foremost immigrants from poor countries. The French government decided to stem all non-EEC immigration in the summer of 1974 through the Postel-Vinay circulars, which precisely targeted nationals of African territories formerly under French rule. Among immigrants, the poorest indeed faced the most serious employment difficulties. In addition to poor immigrants and their descendants, the other important category that, like them, had a low level of skills and therefore clashed with the new threshold for employment was that of young workers. The unemployment rate of 15-24 year-olds grew from the 3rd quarter of 1969 to the 3rd quarter of 1984 from 3.7% to 24.6%. [21] This figure was several points higher than observed in other developed countries.

European Monetary Discipline and Labour Force Segmentation

By the second half of the 1970s, the first step of the French government was to break the inflationary cycle of wage increases, price increases, and currency devaluations by first renouncing the use of the latter. In addition to limiting inflation, important in itself, the French government wished so to attract international investments in order to help firms to increase the productivity of the workforce. The renunciation of devaluations should be correlated with a limitation of price increases and a transition toward wage moderation. The final communiqué of the European Council in Bremen on 6 and 7 July 1978, where the creation of the European monetary system was decided, stated :
“Efforts to reduce inflation and disparities in the evolution of costs and prices between countries must continue. […] Countries whose prices rise strongly will first focus their attention on adverse inflationary developments.” [22]
In the following years, inflation gradually came under control. Provisions for wage moderation were adopted. The sliding scale of wages was abolished in 1982. However, the minimum wage indexation on the consumer price index was not modified ; from 1983, the government only more strictly interpreted the SMIC law of 1970 to grant lower increases.
As a result of the higher minimum wage, the government accepted forms of employment offering more flexibility to employers to adjust their employment level according to the general economic situation. The law of 25 July 1985 relaxed the legislation on temporary work, both in terms of proof to be submitted by the employer for the use of such contracts and in terms of the maximum duration of these contracts, extended to 24 months with administrative permission. With difficulty, unions finally accepted this evolution in exchange for an increased role both at the political level and in firms. [23] This increased role allowed them to better defend their core members, whose status remained unchanged. The categories likely to fall in unstable forms of employment and therefore to endure the bulk of economic adjustments were indeed underrepresented among union members : they were poor immigrants and their descendants, as well as young people. [24] After the change of government in 1986, the use of temporary contracts was further relaxed and the law of 30 December 1986 repealed the administrative authorisation for collective dismissals. [25] From 1983 to 2003, the number of employees in short-term contracts (
contrats à durée déterminée , CDD) grew by more than 500% to represent more than 1.6 million employees. [26] This resulted in a new segmentation of the labour force. The political consequences of this situation pushed more importantly governments to encourage investments to adapt the productivity to the wage norm.

The Second Call to Northern Europe

France thus sought, in partnership with West Germany and other European states, to increase its attractiveness to international investors. First, in order to create a dynamic financial sector in France, restrictions on the activities of foreign banks were relaxed ; the Paris stock exchange was reformed in the second half of the 1980s. France even encouraged the process of liberalizing capital flows, which would encourage competition in the financial sector and would benefit large French banks. Finally, from 1984 and consistently thereafter, France supported the project of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). [27] The EMU offered the opportunity of a currency inspiring as much confidence as the Deutschmark to international investors. In exchange for the Single Market and French aid on military issues, Germany eventually accepted the EMU. [28] But the Germans laid down strict conditions, accepted by the French, to ensure the stability of the single currency and its international credibility. In accordance with the Treaty of Maastricht, signed on 7 February 1992, the European Central Bank should be independent and have the sole objective of stabilizing prices. This implied that interventions of the Central Bank in the wake of generous wage policies were no longer possible. Public deficits should not exceed 3% of the GDP and public debt should not exceed 60% of the GDP. State interventions which substituted market adjustments rendered impossible by labour legislation were therefore limited. Thus Germany demanded a transformation of the employment regime in France as a condition for the adoption of the single currency.
However the political lines stabilized since the mid-1980s did not modify. The main attempt took place in 2005-2006. The
contrat nouvelle embauche (CNE, new hiring contract) created by an order and a decree of August 2, 2005 targeted small businesses, or those that were the most affected by the lack of adjustment possibilities generated by wage rigidity. With the CNE, the employer could dismiss the employee within two years following the conclusion of the contract without justification. According to the ministry of Labour Direction de l’animation de la recherche, des études et des statistiques (Dares, direction of the animation of research, studies and statistics), at the end of 2006, between 360,000 and 460,000 CNEs had already been signed. Nevertheless, in July 2007 the Paris Appeal Court and in 2008 the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations of the International Labour Office (ILO) found that the CNE violated ILO Convention No. 158 of 1982, which required justifying dismissals. [29] The CNE was finally abolished by Article 11 of the inter-professional national agreement of January 11, 2008. [30]
The minimum wage did not experience significant changes either. The main action in this field was a reduction from the mid-1990s of the social charges paid by employers in addition to the gross wage. This reduction was the most important at the level of the minimum wage and gradually declined for higher wages to prevent threshold effects. These complicated mechanisms however only enabled the firms that were able to use them to bring back, at constant prices, the cost of an employee paid at the minimum wage at the level reached at the end of 1982. After that date, the SMIC indeed continued to increase beyond inflation at an average rate of 1.9% per year, a rate 50% higher than that observed from 1950 to 1967 for the SMIG. According to Dares Acemo surveys, the proportion of employees paid at the minimum wage exceeded 16% in 2005, and even 30% in firms with less than ten employees. In addition, these figures do not take into account agriculture, temping, and domestic services, where the share of employees paid the minimum wage is the highest. [31] The French labour market remained out of reach for the great mass of migrants attracted by France. The fight against immigration remained a constant in French politics and the weakness of legal labour immigration a characteristic feature of France compared with other major economies of Northwest Europe. [32]
This well-defined French case leads us to assess whether this sequence of events was also at work in other Mediterranean countries.

General Pattern for Mediterranean Europe since the Early 1980s

By the early 1980s, EEC Mediterranean countries were facing significant migratory pressure from countries of the South and East of the Mediterranean. Geographical proximity favoured these movements. [33] The wage differences between the two shores of the Mediterranean and the economic growth in Mediterranean Europe also generated new migration flows. Italy, whose economic development took place the earliest in Mediterranean Europe, already surpassed Maghreb countries in the early 1970s with a GDP per capita ratio of 1 to 10. [34] In addition, demographic divergences intensified migratory pressure. The average annual increase of the non-agricultural workforce at the end of the 1980s represented 2.17 million people in southern Mediterranean countries against only 460,000 people throughout the EEC. [35] In the early 1990s, there were already two million immigrants in Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece, including one million in Italy. [36] Italy attracted migrants from Tunisia, Egypt, Yugoslavia, but also Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, and the Sudan. Spain attracted migrants from Morocco and Algeria, but also Latin America and Guinea.
Has this new migration pressure induced a tightening of wage standards in Mediterranean Europe ? The main feature of employment regimes in Mediterranean Europe was the protection of employment. Layoffs were difficult and costly for employers. These features, presented by the jurist Philippe Martin in this volume, were partly formed during episodes of dictatorship to compensate for the deficit of legitimacy of governments. Thus the protection of the employee’s job in Spain dates back to the 1944 legislation on the employment contract and dismissals. The heavy compensation for dismissals in Italy, the trattamento di fine rapporto , appeared in the 1927 labour charter. From the 1980s, as far as wages were concerned, the main development in Spain was the abolition, between 1990 and 1997, of the various minimum wages for young people. As a result, the minimum wage for 16 year-olds was multiplied in current prices by almost four between 1989 and 1998, from 601 pesetas per day for the year 1989 [37] to 2,268 pesetas per day for the year 1998. [38] This represented, at constant prices, a multiplication by about 2.5. This evolution was opposed to the trends in other European countries. In the Netherlands, the indexing of the minimum wage on the average wage in the private sector was abolished in 1982 and the minimum wage even decreased by 3% in 1984. In the United Kingdom, any minimum wage, except in agriculture, was abolished in 1993. [39] In Italy, conventional wage developments are difficult to know because wage bargaining is decentralized, sector-by-sector.
Mediterranean European economies have also presented indirect features of employment regimes with a high employment threshold. First is the unemployment level of young people. As the graph below shows, taken from a study of the Dares and relying on OECD data for the year 2010, [40] with a few exceptions the employment rate of the 15-24 year-olds highlighted two categories of countries within the former EU 15 : Northern European countries, where this rate was usually higher than 40% and Mediterranean European countries, where this rate was usually lower than 30%.

Employment rate for the 15-24 year-olds in 2010

Source : OECD

The second sign of a high employment threshold in Mediterranean Europe is the development of a large informal sector and a clandestine population. By the mid-1980s, the informal sector represented 5% of the Spanish GNP and 20 to 30% of the Italian GNP. [41] The building industry, agriculture and fisheries, textiles, domestic services, and mines were particularly concerned. The wages paid were often below the legal or conventional wages in these branches of activity. [42] Illegal immigrants were widely represented, benefiting from the loose control of small firms in Mediterranean Europe, [43] as well as at the borders of these countries, which were unwilling to jeopardize tourism. [44] These migrants were Filipino or Cape Verdean women in domestic services, agricultural workers from Morocco in Catalonia or those from Tunisia in Sicily and Tuscany, and those from Cape Verde in the Algarve as well as Egyptian and Tunisian sailors who worked with Greek or Sicilian ship-owners. Senegalese street hawkers spread also in every big city of Mediterranean Europe. [45] The clandestine population was estimated at the end of the 1980s to half a million people in Italy, or even more, 300,000 people in Spain, 50,000 in Portugal and at least 40,000 in Greece. [46] These elements suggest, both in Italy and in other EC Mediterranean countries, the existence of high and rigid wage standards making recourse to illegal work particularly advantageous.
Maastricht criteria and the conditions they imposed for employment regimes were to affect those countries in particular. After the Treaty of Maastricht, the 1993 European Commission White Paper “Growth, competitiveness and employment” called for labour markets reforms as well as the Employment Title in the Treaty of Amsterdam, leading to the European Employment Strategy. [47] In its 2006 Green Paper “Modernising labour law to meet the challenges of the 21st century”, the European Commission took as models the Danish and Dutch experiences and attacked the arrangements that guaranteed too strong a security to some employees. [48] In Italy, as Philippe Martin explains in this volume, collective dismissals for economic reasons were loosened as early as 1991 and the Decree-Law 368/2001 liberalized recourse to short-term contracts. In Spain, the 1994 reform multiplied the forms of short-term contracts available to employers and facilitated the use of temporary work. In Italy, in fifteen years, the share of short-term contract workers was then multiplied by 2.5 to increase from 5.3% of workers in 1991 to 13.1% in 2006. In Portugal, the share of short-term contract workers went from 9.5% in 1994 to about 23% in 2008. Spain, which was from the beginning the country within the Euro Area with the highest share of short-term contract workers, remained at this position, reaching even the rate of 34.1% of short-term contract workers in 2006. [49]
As in the French case, previous studies on the issue consider that Mediterranean European countries joined the EMU to promote their position on international financial markets. [50] The assumption that the need to attract more investments to promote convergence between the productivity per worker and the rigid wage standard that had developed cannot therefore be excluded. After the creation of the Euro, access to international financial markets was effectively facilitated in Mediterranean European countries, causing a decline in interest rates before the crisis of 2008-2009. Yet, this change did not fundamentally result in easier access to credit for companies so as to help them increase the productivity of their employees. Mediterranean countries were not as accustomed to low interest rates as Northern European countries were, especially Germany. Credit was traditionally channelled to the housing market, feeding in the 2000s in most Mediterranean countries a real estate bubble. [51] In addition, states used access to credit to subsidize firms in return for concessions to low-paid workers. Those workers could indeed expect an improvement of their wages only from the legal constraint, because immigration permanently prevented any increase of equilibrium wages on low-skill labour markets. In the 2000s, in Spain and France, the minimum wage thus increased beyond inflation in an unprecedented way since the 1970s. The minimum daily wage increased in Spain from 15.35€ in 2004 [52] to 20.8€ in 2009, [53] an increase of 35.5% in five years, whereas the consumer price index increased only by 14% during the same period. [54] In France, between 2002 and 2006, the SMIC increased of 12% above inflation, at a rate of 3% per year at constant prices, and 3.4% between 2002 and 2005. [55]

Despite the heterogeneity of national cases, commonalities appear among European Mediterranean countries. New migratory pressures modified the employment regimes in these countries, from the 1960s for France and the 1980s for other European Mediterranean countries. Immigration created a downward pressure on wages in destination countries. This broke down the confidence between unions and employers necessary to get the level of wages fluctuate according to the general economic situation. The tightening of wage levels then caused economic regulation through unemployment, leaving the labour market at a sub-optimal point and increasing public debt to manage additional unemployment. The fixing of a rigid wage level was also a factor of inflation, which weakened the currency when the government resorted to devaluation to restore international competitiveness, and which deteriorated the position of the country on international financial markets. The scheme presented in this article needs to be confirmed by documentary research that would be based on the archives of European institutions, the OECD, the ILO, as well as those of the ministries of Employment, Economy and Finance of the main countries.

[1] W. Molle and A. van Mourik, “International Movements of Labour under Conditions of Economic Integration : The Case of Western Europe,” JCMS, 1988, Vol. 26, p. 317-22.

[2] Georges Photios Tapinos, L’immigration étrangère en France : 1946-1973, Paris, Presses universitaires de France, 1975, p. 99.

[3] Historical archives of the European Union, Florence (HAEU). CM2 1969 1061. Dossier concernant le 10e rapport de la Commission au Conseil sur les problèmes de main-d’œuvre dans la Communauté en 1969. Extrait du projet de procès-verbal de la 90e session du Conseil tenue à Bruxelles, les lundi 24 et mardi 25 novembre 1969.

[4] Office national d’immigration, ministère des Affaires sociales. Cité par G. P. Tapinos, op. cit., p. 99.

[5] Ministère des Affaires sociales. Cited by : Detlev Albers, Werner Glodschmidt, Paul Oehlke, Lotte sociali in Europa 1968-1974, Rome, Editori Riuniti, 1976, p. 42.

[6] Central archives of the Council of the European Union, Brussel (CACEU). Red list 31316. Rapport sur les résultats d’une enquête sur le logement des travailleurs migrants.

[7] Source : Commission of the European Communities. Cited by : G. P. Tapinos, op. cit., p. 108.

[8] G. P. Tapinos, op. cit., p. 99.

[9] HAEU. CM2 1968 982. Dossier concernant le rapport de la Commission sur les problèmes de main d’œuvre dans la Communauté en 1966-1967.

[10] Karl Lauschke, „Der Wandel in der betrieblichen und gewerkschaftlichen Interessenvertretung nach den westdeutschen Septemberstreiks“, in Bernd Gehrke, Gerd-Rainer Horn (ed.), 1968 und die Arbeiter. Studien zum ‘proletarischen Mai’ in Europa, Hamburg, 2007, p. 76.

[11] Francesco Petrini, “Forze sociali e globalizzazione. Lo scontro sulle multinazionali nei lunghi anni settanta”, in Mauro Campus (ed.), Sviluppo, crisi, integrazione. Temi di storia delle relazioni internazionali per il XXI secolo, Milan-Turin, Bruno Mondadori, Pearson Italia, 2012, p. 274.

[12] Accords de Grenelle, 27 mai 1968.

[13] Décret n° 67-508 du 29 juin 1967 portant majoration du salaire minimum national interprofessionnel garanti et réduction du nombre de zones, Journal officiel de la République française (JORF), 30 juin 1967, p. 6492.

[14] Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques (Insee) :

[15] Décret n° 50-1029 du 23 août 1950 portant fixation du salaire national minimum interprofessionnel garanti, JORF, 24 août 1950, p. 9061-9062.

[16] Accords de Grenelle, op. cit.

[17] Loi n° 70-7 du 2 janvier 1970 portant réforme du salaire minimum garanti et création d’un salaire minimum de croissance, JORF, 4 janvier 1970, p. 141-142.

[18] Décret n° 82-1015 du 1er décembre 1982 portant relèvement du salaire minimum de croissance en métropole et dans les départements d’outre-mer, JORF, 2 décembre 1982, p. 3644.

[19] Insee :

[20] European Commission, Economic and Financial Affairs, AMECO Database, /economy_finance/ameco/user/serie/SelectSerie.cfm. Cited by : Francesco Petrini, “The politics of inflation and disinflation : the Italian case”, in Adaptation of States and European Economic Actors to the Inflationary Fever of the 1970s. Arras, 15-16 November 2012, to be published.

[21] Insee, “Série archive : Chômage et taux de chômage au sens du Bureau international du Travail selon l’ancienne définition, par sexe et âge regroupé, en fin de trimestre, données cvs”, 1968-2004.

[22] Conseil européen des 6-7 juillet 1978 à Brême : situation économique et sociale – politique monétaire. Doc/78/2.

[23] Johan Bo Davidsson and Patrick Emmenegger (Nov. 2012), “Insider-Outsider Dynamics and the Reform of Job Security Legislation”, in Giuliano Bonoli and David Natali (eds.), The Politics of the New Welfare State, Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 215-216.

[24] B. Ebbinghaus, “Trade Union Movements in Post-Industrial Welfare States”, in K. Armingeon and G. Bonoli (ed.), The Politics of Post-Industrial Welfare States : Adapting Post-War Social Policies to New Social Risks, London, Routledge, 2006, p. 128, 130

[25] Philippe Martin, « Flexibilité et sécurité : le droit social français en quête de nouveaux équilibres », in Ph. Auvergnon, Emploi et protection sociale : de nouvelles relations ?, Bordeaux, Presses universitaires de Bordeaux, 2009, p. 202-4.

[26] Ph. Martin, op. cit., p. 205.

[27] Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe : Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht, Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1998, p. 404, 409-410.

[28] Archives nationales, Paris. Archives d’Élisabeth Guigou. 5 AG 4/EG 69, dossier 1. Note du ministère des Affaires européennes au Président de la République, 10 mai 1989. Objet : Les questions européennes qui devraient faire l’objet d’un accord entre vous-même et le chancelier Kohl avant le début de la présidence française.

[29] Ph. Martin, op. cit., p. 217-219.

[30] Ph. Martin, op. cit., p. 222.

[31] Dares, Premières informations et premières synthèses, « Les bénéficiaires de la revalorisation du SMIC au 1er juillet 2006 », mars 2007, n° 13.1,

[32] Camilla Devitt, “Labour Migration Governance in Contemporary Europe. The Case of France”, LAB-MIG-GOV Project : “Which labour migration governance for a more dynamic and inclusive Europe ?”, Fieri Working papers, April 2012, p. 5,

[33] Archives of the Council of Europe, Strasbourg (ACE). Doc. 6211. 24/04/1990. Nouveaux pays d’immigration. Rapport de M. Alfons Cuco Giner (Espagne), Commission des migrations, des réfugiés et de la population.

[34] CACEU, Red list 31316. Rapport sur les résultats d’une enquête sur le logement des travailleurs migrants.

[35] CACEU, Red list 68830. Rapport d’experts de la Commission au Conseil du 10 octobre 1990 sur les politiques d’immigration et intégration sociale des immigrés dans la Communauté européenne.

[36] Russell King, “Migration and the Single Market for Labour : An Issue in Regional Development”, in Mark Blacksell and Allan M. Williams (eds), The European Challenge : Geography and Development in the European Community, Oxford ; New York, Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 234-235.

[37] Real Decreto 23/1988, de 13 de enero, por el que se fija el salario mínimo interprofesional para 1989, Boletín Oficial del Estado (BOE), 14, de 17 de enero de 1989, p. 1223.

[38] Real Decreto 2015/1997, de 26 de diciembre, por el que se fija el salario mínimo interprofesional para 1998, BOE, 311, de 29 de diciembre de 1997, p. 38172-38173.

[39] Juan Dolado, Francia Kramarz, Stephen Machin, Alan Manning, David Mwgolis, Coen Teulings, “The Economic Impact of Minimum Wages in Europe,” Economic Policy, Oct. 1996, p. 320-344.

[40] Document d’études – Dares – 2011, 166 – L’emploi des jeunes, p. 13.

[41] ACE, doc. 6211, op. cit.

[42] Ibid.

[43] ACE, Council of Europe, Conference of Ministers on the movement of persons coming from Central and Eastern European countries (Vienna, 24-25 January 1991), Migratory movements from Central and East European countries to Western Europe – some selected aspects. Document submitted by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), Strasbourg, 1991, MMP (91) 4, Paper prepared by IOM’s Senior Consultant, Professor Bimal Ghosh.

[44] ACE, doc. 6211, op. cit.

[45] Ibid. And : R. King, op. cit., p. 234-235.

[46] ACE, doc. 6211, op. cit. ; ACE, MMP (91) 4, op. cit.

[47] Jean-Vincent Koster, « Le dialogue social européen à l’épreuve de la ‘modernisation’ du marché du travail », Revue française des affaires sociales, 1-2012 (n° 1), p. 67.

[48] Ph. Martin, op. cit., p. 198-199.

[49] Eurostat, Temporary employees as percentage of the total number of employees, by sex and age (%) [lfsa_etpga]. Last update : 11-06-2013

[50] E. Jones, J. Frieden and F. Torres (eds), Joining Europe’s Monetary Club. The Challenges for Smaller Member States, New York, St Martin’s Press, 1998.

[51] David Marsh, “Faltering Ambitions and Unrequited Hopes : The Battle for the Euro Intensifies”, JCMS, 2011, Volume 49, Annual Review, p. 51.

[52] Real Decreto 1793/2003, de 26 de diciembre, por el que se fija el salario mínimo interprofesional para 2004, BOE, 310, de 27 de diciembre de 2003, p. 46232-46233.

[53] Real Decreto 2128/2008, de 26 de diciembre, por el que se fija el salario mínimo interprofesional para 2009, BOE, 314, de 30 de diciembre de 2008, p. 52429-52430.

[54] Instituto Nacional de Estadística. Indice de Precios de Consumo. Medias anuales.

[55] Insee.

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